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1. HOLISM AND ATOMISM 
1 . 1 .  T h e r e  i s  n o  i m m e d i a t e  k n o w l e d g e 
There is no foundation of human know ledge in subjective sensations. There fore, 
there is no construction of knowledge from bottom up, starting merely with in-
dividual perceptions, as animals must do. The reason is that human knowledge 
must be understood as a joint development of co operative and individual techni-
ques and faculties, including its ver ba lizations, rather than a merely ontogenetic 
development of individual skills on the ground of phylogenetic evolution. This 
is no claim or belief to start with. Rather, we implicitly and practically all know 
it as a basic truth of our mode of being in the world: We learn many things by 
words and we learn to understand what we perceive by the concepts that come 
with these words. 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Phenomenology of spirit already shows the 
corresponding errors in tradi tional empiricism with its assimilation of human 
knowledge to animal perception and skills. Its clearest expression until today 
we find in David Hume. At the same time, Hegel criticizes rationalism as it is 
traditionally identified with René Descartes’ mystification of a self-conscious 
thinking self. In fact, Hegel’s Phenomenology develops its insights into the social 
constitution of human in telligence, under standing, con sciousness and self-
-consciousness by a method of deconstruction, which he calls ‘dialectics’. This 
 method is, at the same time, destructive and re-con structive. It proceeds by 
step wise criti cism of all too naïve or all too easy real and possible answers to the 
question what the human spirit is. Methodologically identical but the matically 
different is the procedure of Hegel’s Science of logic. This book also deconstructs 
all too naïve positions. But now the topic is being, i.e. what exists and what is 
true. The goal of the Logic is, however, much the same as of the Phenomenology. 
The goal is to lay the methodological grounds for any self-con scious, i.e. self-
controlled, concept of knowledge, truth, and rea lity. The dialectical or decon-
structive analysis of these concepts proceeds, so to speak, from top down.
The rationale for starting at the top is that analysis comes before synthesis: 
Our reflection on the relation between our knowledge and the world, or rather, 
on the very concept of knowledge and the very concept of the world, begins, and 
must begin, from inside a whole tradition of knowledge and experience. This is 
an undeniable fact. And it is a methodological rule. We must acknowledge it and 
deal with it. I propose to refer to it as the t r u t h  o f  h o l i s m  i n  a n y  s e l f -
c o n s c i o u s  p h i l o s o p h y  o f  k n o w l e d g e  a n d  s c i e n c e. 
Today’s analytical philosophy prefers, instead, to build all the things in the 
world and all our knowledge of them up from al le gedly immediately given 
atoms. In doing so, analytic philosophy is not analytical. Despite all ver bal at-
tacks on ‘syn thetic’ philosophy, as we can find it nicely represented in Bertrand 
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Russell’s polemics, analytical philosophy believes without any further grounds 
and sufficient arguments in some kind of l o g i c a l  a t o m i s m. But logical at-
omism presents no analysis  of the presupposed elements in language and 
science. It rather presents a s y n t h e t i c a l  c o n s t r u c t i o n  of a more or less 
simple formal eidolon in the sense of Plato. Such an eidolon is a logical toy model, 
a formal picture, through which the analytical philo sopher, as he calls himself, 
wants to understand and explain the rela tion between language, science, and the 
world. Unfortunately, there is a great danger that the corresponding eidolon of 
language and propositions on the one side, the ‘world’ of ‘things’ to which our 
names sentences refer on the other side, produces an ideo-logy. It results from 
the all too narrow per spective of the guiding eidolon or, as Wittgenstein has put 
it, from a one-sided diet when thinking of language, knowledge, and the world. 
In short, the basic problem of analytical philosophy and scientism and their hid-
den ideology of logical atomism lies in a lack of analysis of the ‘elements’ of their 
synthetic con structions, as Hegel himself famously has stressed. 
In mathematics, we indeed begin with elements, for example with numbers 
and with (elementary) arithmetical pro positions. But if we want to understand 
what it means to assume these numbers and numerical truths as given, we rather 
need a philosophical analysis of the conceptual constitution of them. An im-
portant issue is this: Numbers and propositions are accessible only via corre-
sponding number-terms and sen tences. And they ‘exist’ only in the form of our 
mathematical practice. 
Real knowledge is much more complex than any ability to deal with the 
axioms and deductive rules of a formal calculus like a computing machine. This 
is so because of our relation to the real world. And this means that we have to 
understand the notion of a world, which I or you do not only talk about, but 
really experience. What we only can talk about, are mere possibilities or merely 
intelligible worlds of thought. In such worlds, we find only Dinge an sich. On 
the other way round, things in themselves, as such, are only things of thought. 
This is one of the most important systematic insights of Hegel, which parts him 
from Immanuel Kant. Of what we can say that it really exists must show itself 
somehow in our human experience. On the other hand, claims about real exist-
ence always involve some partly generic and, as such, situation-invariant, partly 
empirical and as such situation-variant form and content. 
Now we can also see that, and how, real languages are different from the 
merely formal languages of mathematical theories. The language of science is not 
just mathematics, because it refers to a world of real experience. Mathematics is 
merely a formal backbone of mathematical physics. In short, our real practice 
of science and knowledge cannot be understood or made explicit if we view it 
only through the lens of formal theories. Rather, this way to look at it produces 
the ideology of scientism.
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1 . 2 .  H e g e l i a n  ‘ c a t e g o r i e s ’  d e v e l o p  i n t o  a  w h o l e  s y s t e m 
o f  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s  a n d  i n f e r e n c e s 
Our leading question now is what it means to start, as Hegel does, with such 
general words or ‘categories’ as ‘being’ and ‘nothing’ and what it means to ‘deve-
lop’ or ‘deduce’ such words or ‘categories’ as ‘becoming’ and ‘being there’ and via 
them other ‘categories’ like ‘quality’ and ‘quan tity’, ‘measure’ and ‘essence’. A first 
answer to this question is this: These words or categories just name most general 
forms by which we reflect on the relation of thinking or speaking and the world. 
We all use them every now and then in our practice of reflecting on general forms 
of speech. But in this use, we are usually not aware of their meaning. And, what 
is worse, we tend to forget the presuppositions involved in their use. Therefore, 
there is some need of developing a more self-conscious use of such ‘categorials’. 
Hegel’s enterprise is, indeed, guided by this goal. The steps he proposes to 
go in his analysis lead us, so to speak, ‘down’ from the more general to the more 
particular categories. The reason is this: Self-conscious analysis makes the scales 
of methodologically ordered presuppositions explicit. In doing so, it develops 
our self-conscious knowledge about the peculiarity of human knowledge. As 
such, it is the ‘metaphysical’ knowledge of Aristotle’s noesis noeseos, which turns 
out to be the same enterprise as Kant’s transcendental analysis, if it is correctly 
understood. 
We therefore should by no means confuse Hegel’s steps of developing ca-
tegories with deductions in our modern sen se. In such a deduction, we start 
with axioms and derive theorems according to some already accepted rules of 
de duction. According to Hegel’s idea of a logical development, we rather pro-
ceed in sho wing what is already presupposed when we explicitly use, or implicitly 
(practically) refer to, the categories in question. 
1 . 3  B e i n g  i s  t r u t h,  c o n t e n t  i s  f o r m 
But how does Hegel work his way down from the most general and abstract to 
the more concrete and particular ‘categories’? Hegel begins with the category 
of being . There might be many things to say what this category is. I take it 
that ‘being’ is the most general label for anything that (allegedly) exists in some 
sense or other. That is, it is a super-label for existence, reality, truth, objectivity 
and other sub-labels like this. In a sense, ‘being’ stands, at least at first, for the 
f o r m a l  i d e a  o f  e x i s t e n c e  of the world at large and of determined objects 
in the world, of states of affairs or of processes and events. In other words, Hegel 
does not distin gu ish yet be tween the whole world and limited realms of objects, 
real pro perties and true pro positions, at least not at the beginning. Nor does he 
distinguish yet between the level of re fe ren ce and the level of expression. Like 
Par me nides, one of his self-elected predecessors, he just names a topic or rather, 
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a problem by mentioning and using the word ‘being’. And he proceeds by 
asking what we mean when we use this word. In short, for a diligent reader there 
should be no question that this ca te gory of being corresponds to the category of 
for mal truth — only that in the latter case we talk about ex pressions of formal 
knowledge, not about what it is knowledge of. 
The immediate problem now is that being or truth would be empty if we 
had no criteria for distinguishing truth from untruth, be ing from not being. 
Therefore, there is no concept of truth without negation, i.e. with out m a k i n g 
a  d i f f e r e n  c e  t o  n o n - b e i n g  a n d  f a l s e h o o d.  T h e  c a t e g o r y  of being 
therefore contains, in this sense, al ready non-being as its opposite. This means 
the following: Being is defined only in re la tion to non-being. Truth is defined 
only in relations to falsehood. But how should we understand the criteria or rules 
for these differentiations? The road of Hegel’s analytical reflection leads now to 
further ca te go ries like b e c o m i n g  or c h a n g e  and p r e s e n c e  or Dasein. This 
means that we have to accept the fact that any p o s s i b l e  distinction between 
truth and falsehood can only be made a c t u a l  in a present world of empirical 
changes, as Heraclitus has seen already. It will turn out that in this real, empiri-
cal, world not only ‘things’ change, but the ‘mea nings’ of words, too. I.e. there is 
also a development of our systems of distinctions and inferences, expressed by 
our words. We therefore have to account for the fact that any actualization of 
meaningful speech, any speech-act, and its proper understanding, is, in one way 
or other, b o u n d  t o  t h e  p r e s e n t  s i t u a t i o n  of di scourse, even though it 
a l s o  transcends the situation and perspective of the speaker, or else it could not 
be understood by others, who, by default, are in different situations and occupy 
different points of perspectives. 
In other words, we can never t o t a l l y  undo the p e r f o r m a t i v e, i.e. s u b -
j e c t i v e,  and the dialogical, i.e. c o - o p e r a t i v e,  aspects of meaningful speech, 
even in its written form, as Plato, the third in the row of Hegel’s philosophical 
heroes, already knows. As a result, transcendence of our subjectivism (and cor-
responding finitudes) remains always somehow ‘relative’. As a result, we have to 
distinguish between relevant or essential and irrelevant and ines sential features 
of the particular situations of speaker and hearer. By doing so, we relativize ge-
neric invariance. In other words, when we ‘abstract’ from actual situa tions, as we 
do especially in our reflections on semantic forms, we do not arrive at absolutely 
invariant sentence mea ning. We arrive at best at generic forms of dialogical un-
derstanding. 
The resulting problem of this insight is to reconcile the very idea of situ-
ation in variant meaning and truth with the limitations of our actual use (of 
schemes) of conceptual differen tia tions, identifications and inferences. Only 
on the ground of such recon cilia tion we can understand the concept of non-
subjective knowledge and science. The problem is analogous to Plato’s problem 
of methexis or projection of forms unto the real word of possibly actual human 
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experience, as it is discussed in the dialogue Parmenides, which was praised by 
Hegel emphatically as the first ‘speculative’, i.e. highest-level, reflection on mean-
ing and truth. The main and leading question now is: How do actual things 
share properties with generic forms? 
2. FORMAL AND REAL BEING 
2 . 1 .  B e i n g  i n  i t s e l f  i s  f o r m a l  b e i n g  a s  s u c h
There is a traditional dis tinction between b e i n g  i n  i t s e l f  and b e i n g  f o r 
i t s e l f . Being in itself or as such (an sich, kath’auto) is, as Hegel was the first 
to no tice, merely abstract existence, produced by our ways of talking and thin-
king. Everything which exists only an sich does not really exist yet. For example, 
Sherlock Holmes exists as such, or Zeus or the archangel Michael, just as the 
number 7 or the strings of string theory. Of some of these things we know that 
they do not exist actually. But of other things, for example, of the zoo of subato-
mic particles in modern particle physics, we do know that they somehow really 
exist even though we sometimes do not understand the precise way in which 
they do. Therefore, it is much easier to know what these particles are an sich, in 
themselves, than to know what they really are, an und für sich, i.e. ‘in-and-for-
themselves’. We know what they are as such because books tell us. What things 
are an sich is not at all unknown. It is by no means forever hidden behind the 
veil of our subjectivism, as Kant has made us believe. It is, rather, the best known 
part of them. This is, as I already have said, one of Hegel’s basic insights. It de nies 
much more radically than Kant any reference to a world totally behind the scene 
of ex perience. Such transcendent reference is logically im possible. It is not well 
defined. Whoever thinks other wise mistakes the mere claim of transcendent 
reference for an accomplished reference.2 But when we nevertheless sometimes 
talk about things in themselves, we focus, in fact, on con cep tual form and ab-
stract reference. 
If we say, for example, that numbers in themselves (or as such) cannot be 
perceived, we comment on the fact that it is no essential feature of the numbers 
as such that we can see or hear or touch number-t e r m s , even though we need 
some such repre sen tations. A blind person can do arith metic or geometry on 
the ground of acoustical or ‘haptical’ perception (of touching things), a deaf 
person certainly needs additional help of ‘optical’ signs. Numbers as such do 
exist as forms, but only as forms. As forms they are grounded in a practice in 
2 A whole tradition of classical analytical philosophy does not see that Hegel is even more 
radical in this critical insight than logical empiricism. The latter shows a highly ambi valent 
attitude to dogmatic physicalism. In fact, the refutation of Kant’s tin ke ring with noumena or 
things in themselves had been one of Hegel’s core concerns.
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which we make use of a whole system of possible representations of numbers for 
example by number terms in orde rings of sequences of things and in counting 
sets of things. When we talk about numbers as such, we talk about (sub)forms 
of a whole practice of cal culation and therefore also about forms of possible 
(speech) acts.
The example of numbers shows that what philosophers have addressed since 
the times of Plato by using phrases like ‘(being) in itself ’ are in fact sub forms 
of a complex form. Being for itself or Fürsichsein refers, in contrast, to a set of 
possible actualizations by individual tokens. 
2 . 2 .  B e i n g  f o r  i t s e l f  r e f e r s  t o  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s 
i n  e m p i r i c a l  a p p e a r a n c e s
Hegel uses the distinction between being as such and being for itself in order 
to articulate the corresponding double aspect of any act of referring to concrete 
objects in the real world, namely the generic and ab stract type or form of the 
object, and the actual token by which it is actually represented. The phrase ‘(be-
ing) in itself ’ or ‘(being) as such’ or An-sich-Sein is used in cases in which we 
re fer to a merely p o s s i b l e  t h i n g  or rather to a merely ‘intelligible’ object of 
thinking. Such reference always comes in an ab stract and situation-independent, 
generic way. When we are asked to focus in our reflection on this aspect, we 
are asked to think about the thing as such or an sich.3 We all know from some 
practice that, and how, we talk about the lion as such, about art in itself or the 
German an sich, and what we mean when we say that something fulfils a condi-
tion only an sich, but not really. The phrase ‘(being) for itself ’ or Für-sich-Sein 
is, however, used when Hegel wants us to focus on the indivi duality of the case 
he refers to anaphorically in a present situation of discourse. In such a case, the 
identity of the thing we refer to always appears as a relation between different 
possible presentations of it. Notice that the Latin ex pression pro se esse indeed 
means ‘to stand in a relation to itself ’. In a sen se, the identity of any thing al ways 
comes together with an equiva lence-re lation between different ‘ap pearances’, 
‘presen tations’ and (symbolic) ‘representations’ of the thing; and there is no way 
of tal king about any such identity or equivalence outside our practice of iden ti-
fying and differentiating things. 
Now we see why being for itself is a fairly difficult ‘category’. It is the ca tegory 
in which we seem to talk about an object as if our conceptual grasp of it were 
not relevant for what it is for itself. But the thing we refer to is always already 
3 Hegel makes it clear that he refers to Parmenides, Heraclitus and Plato. Nevertheless, it 
is usually underestimated how important his authentic reading of these authors and of Aristo-
tle is for Hegel’s ideas in his science of logic, down to the appropriate use of the term ‘as such’ 
or ‘in itself ’ as the translation of the Greek kath’auto. 
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a kind of amalgam of its generically and conceptually determined being-in-itself 
and our judgments about ‘its’ actualizations or actual presentations and repre-
sentations, by which we identify the concrete thing an und für sich. By the way, 
in a sense we cannot talk about numbers as objects ‘for themselves’. This is so 
because numbers are no individual objects of experience, but only general objects 
of thought. On the other hand, it is perfectly fine to talk about the Fürsichsein of 
individual representations of numbers. This refers to the practical identification 
of sign-types, i.e. to the practice of ‘reading’ a token as a token of a type, or, what 
amounts to the same, to the distinction between ciphers and number terms like 
‘1’ and ‘2’ or ‘11’ and ‘12’. 
2 . 3 .  B e i n g  i n  a n d  f o r  i t s e l f  i s  t h e  c o n c r e t e  t h i n g 
Any sufficiently invariant object of concrete understanding exists i n - a n d -
f o r - i t  s e l f. This means that it is already understood as an actua li za tion of 
a determinate generic form. In fact, Hegel interprets Plato’s idea (in itself ) as 
such a generic form. The Latin word con-crescere means ‘to grow together’, ‘to 
amalgamate’. In any reference to a concrete object, a generic form and its actual 
embo diment are already, in this sense, ‘grown together’. Since it is presupposed 
that the object is an ac tua lization of t h i s … (and not t h a t …) form or Hegelian 
idea, a certain pre-know ledge about the Platonic idea is pre supposed. We see 
now that there is a task to explicate the relevant Platonic or Hegelian idea or 
generic form of something, which usually is presupposed implicitly. This is the 
task of (transcendental) philosophical analysis, properly understood. 
Explicit judgments about relevance bring, so to speak, ideal propositions 
about ideal forms self-consciously back to the real world. We know this case best 
from applying the propositions of mathematical geometry to the real world of 
measured distances and angles. As we can see now, too, know ledge about (ideal) 
forms (as such) plays an important role in any articulated empirical knowledge, 
in which objective claims of truths are articulated. Such knowledge about ge-
neric forms as such can be learnt by heart or even represented as mathematical, 
i.e. merely schematically lear nable pre-knowledge of what we empirically can 
perceive. As such, the know ledge about generic form plays a certain a priori role 
in any concrete (hence empirical) knowledge. Knowledge about generic forms is, 
on the other hand, in the explained sense an a priori presupposition of explicitly 
articulated empirical knowledge. Knowledge about generic forms is conceptual 
knowledge. As such, it goes far beyond the so called ‘analytical’ truths of mere 
definitional conventions like “a bachelor is a man who never was married” or 
the like. 
Plato was the first to notice the important conceptual fact that eidetic or ge-
neric truths, for example about lions or atoms or about chemical substances, are 
the real goal of any proper science, which, as such does not list huge amounts of 
453Conceptual thinking in Hegel’s Science of logic
singular facts, but develops our concepts. In fact, these eidetic truths play the role 
of presupposed conceptual knowledge when we use the corresponding words 
in empirical statements about singular cases and say, for example that the lion 
Jonathan is sick or that a particular chemical reaction took place here and now. 
Any concrete empirical refe ren ce to an object in the world presupposes some 
such generical knowledge about forms, at least implicitly. Animals have empiri-
cal cognition. But they do not take part in our practice of objective knowledge, 
which is presupposed in any empirical reference to the world. Any such reference 
presupposes a whole system of implicit judgments or rather implicit competence 
of proper action, for example when it comes to recognize that a certain speech 
act is an actua lization of a cer tain form or that a certain appearance is the ap-
pearance of a certain object. 
Judgments are free actions. They do no occur to us. And they can be, like 
other actions, too, right or wrong. For judgments, as for actions, there is al ready 
a normative horizon defined. What is valid or allowed to say or claim, what we 
must give reason for and what it is to give such reasons is defined in this horizon. 
There is no content, hence no judgment, if, what someone says is not already 
understood in the horizon of normativity, defined by what counts as conceptu-
ally ‘true’ or ‘generically reliable’ forms of material inferences. The norms tell us 
what we, the hearer, may or should (not) believe, expect, or do, after the speaker 
has (presumably sincerely and with good reason) said X or did Y. 
The age-old question of se man tics since the time of Plato’s theory of forms 
is, obviously, this: How do we ‘un der stand’, and learn to understand, generic 
meanings of words — starting from individual and particular cases of their use? 
Hegel’s answer runs like this: Understanding is taking part in a whole culture, 
a whole system of joint, cooperatively formed, practices. The sub stantial form 
of the prac tice, its idea, is what is understood. Its essence remains identical in all 
possible and different ways of representing the form or Hegelian idea. Hence, 
we better distinguish between the relevant inner form (or content) and the ir-
relevant outer form, by which the content is represented in particular cases. The 
term ‘concept’ stands for (systems of ) inner forms or contents.
Comprehending contents or concepts consists in ma king appropriate di-
stinctions and inferences in speech acts and non-verbal actions. It is a certain 
competence of acting pro perly, according to the defining norms of the practice 
in question. This is indeed a main re sult of Hegel’s deve lop ment of an argument 
in his Science of logic: There is no other un derstanding of truth and meaning pos-
sible, at least if we do not allow for mystifying and dogmatic answers.4 
4 It should be clear to the reader that the general form in which I express this ‘semantics of 
distinctions and inferen ces’ implicitly refers to Robert Brandom’s idea of a normative and in-
ferential constitution of forms of actions and meaning. Cf. especially BRAN DOM 1994 and 
BRAN DOM 2000. The main difference is that I read Hegel’s logic as a transcendental analy-
sis of presupposed forms in human practice. I do not believe that any genetical ex planation 
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3. LOGIC OF BEING 
3 . 1 .  O b j e c t i v e  l o g i c  a n a l y s e s  w h a t  n o r m a l  s p e a k e r s 
t a k e  f o r  g r a n t e d 
Hegel’s presup positional analysis of the system of categories and the cor-
responding domains of objects of reflection and speech in cludes an analysis of 
truth conditions. For modern readers, this is not easily seen. The first point to 
mention is this: When we explicitly reflect on pro po si tions and states of affairs, 
they are al ways already addressed as objects of reflection. But in their actual use, 
propositions are active performances, namely utterances of sentences. And ‘ex-
isting’ states of affairs are given in actual experiences, not as objects of thought. 
It is a very deep insight, which goes back to Johann Gottlieb Fichte, that there 
is a kind of ‘ontological difference’ (Martin Heidegger) between the mode of 
being of performances and actualized facts on one side, the objects of reflective 
or scientific thought on the other. For being an object of thought, some generic 
to pi calization is presupposed. The logical difference is made perspicuous by 
Gottlob Frege. Frege’s Begriffsschrift makes the differences explicit between 
the performation-sign and the copula (resp. functional application) and, what 
is even more important, between a predicate in its use and a property as an in-
tensional object of reflection, and a set as an extensional object of talk. Ludwig 
Witt genstein, not Bertrand Russell or Rudolf Carnap, sees the importance of 
these distinctions and develops them in his critical philosophical analysis. He 
admonishes us, for example, to replace any my sti fying talk about abstract mean-
ings by talking about forms of use, practice and life. Hegel’s way of listing a row 
of cate gories like presence, quality, quantity, identity and so on, is no less general 
and abstract. But the intention is clear. The task is to transform their pre sup-
po sitions into an analysis of propositional attitudes and speech acts li ke claims, 
beliefs, in tentions or promises. 
In the following, I want to give an outline of the major connections between 
Hegel’s doctrine of being, doctrine of essence and doctrine of concept. The lead-
ing question is how forms relate to real experience. I begin with a short explana-
tion of central place of mea su rement as a paradigm for the need of a projective 
‘mediation’ of abstract forms and em pirical contents. Then I turn to the question 
how to determine the quantificational form of a noun phrase used in a proposi-
tion and how the problem of substance leads Hegel to a special doctrine of es-
sence. Its topics are the dialogical form of individual judgments about the ‘real’ 
re ference of words and the dialectical or hi storical form of objec ti vity and rea-
of how norms and forms may have developed is more than a post hoc story to soothe some 
anxieties of monistic naturalists. There are other ways to get rid of an allegedly trans cendent 
dualism of forms as such and their concrete actualizations.
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son. Finally I try to make sense of Hegel’s difficult claims about different forms 
of ‘judgment’ (Urteil) and ‘inference’ (Schluss) in his doctrine of concept.
3 . 2 .  M e a s u r e m e n t  i s  a  p r o j e c t i o n  o f  f o r m s
The core idea of Hegel’s procedure in his logic can be seen in the third part of 
his d o c t r i n e  o f  b e i n g,  which deals with the category of m e a s u r e. Hegel 
shows why we need an analysis of how we project abstract forms of speech onto 
experien ce by some sort of measurement. This is clear for any merely formal talk 
about geometrical forms and pure numbers or pro portions. Purely mathe ma tical 
propositions do not refer as such to the actual world of possible ex pe rience. 
They do not refer to a transcendent world behind the scene of phe nomena 
either. They are part of a calculus, a formal form of using signs and language. 
They refer to the world of experience only via ap propriate pro jections. Hegel 
calls these projection, parte pro toto, ‘mea sures’. When we use sentences about 
geo me trical forms in a talk about empirical objects, we need a ‘measure’ in order 
to jud ge if concrete figures or gestalts represent the forms well enough. When 
we use arithmetics in calculations we have to identify the relevant units and sets. 
Such a unit is also determined by a ‘measure’ in Hegel’s most general sense. The 
measure determines what is counted. In fact, measures in Hegel’s very general 
sense are the criteria that connect abstract quantitative forms of language as we 
use them in pure arithmetics and geometry with qualitative distinc tions. 
3 . 3 .  Q u a n t i t y  p r e s u p p o s e s  q u a n t i t a t i v e  i d e n t i t y
In order to understand the general problem of reference we now must go back to 
the chapter B in the doctrine of being and the category of quantity. This category 
refers to the quan tifica tio nal forms in which noun phra ses are used as subjects 
in predication. The background problem is this. It is often not the expression 
as such that tells us if it is used as a singular term or as a quantified expression. 
Expressions like ‘some lions’ or ‘many lions’ are only used as quantifiers, but pro-
per names are only usually, not always, used as singular terms. In a sentence like 
“the lion hunts mammals”, the noun phrase ‘the lion’ can name a singular object. 
But it can as well refer to the species of lions. Or it refers to all lions. In the first 
case, the sentence says that a cer tain singular lion, in the last case that every lion 
chases mammals (even though not always). In the generic case it says something 
like this: it is a fea ture of the species that lions hunt mammals. But sometimes, 
for example in zoos, lions survive just by eating carcasses. This leads us to the 
following general observation. In sentences of the following logical form: 
(*) N has the property P
or 
(**) N ε P,
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P replaces a simple or complex (one-place) predicate. It is not too difficult 
to bring sentences somehow under the form (*) or (**).5 By doing so, we put 
some particular focus on the topicalized subject N. We usually think that in 
(elementary) predication N replaces a s i n g u l a r  t e r m . But for Hegel, like for 
Kant, the subject or noun phrase N in focus can have different quantifi ca tional 
forms. Naming something singular in a proposition is only o n e  of the possible 
quan tificational forms of a noun phrase. Therefore we better say that any noun 
phrase N as a subject of a pre dicative sentence of this form is a g e n e r a l i z e d 
q u a n t i f i e r  — fairly much in the way Richard Montague and his followers use 
the term. This means, in a sense, that the classical or traditional understanding 
of the logical form of predication 
N ε P 
is not yet the Fregean ‘functional’ form of ‘elementary’ predication 
P(N).
As a form it is rather still very near to a form of surface grammar. Using the 
idea of Richard Montague we might say in a first approach that it corresponds 
to a form like
N(P).
That is, the subject or noun phrase is a functor that takes the verb phrase as an 
‘argument’. I f  N corresponds to a singular term tN, and i f  the pre di cation can be 
analyzed as a function according to Frege’s proposal, t h e n  N(P) says essentially 
the same as P(tN). 
If we look at noun phrases N as subjects in sentences or propositions of the 
form N ε P in this traditional, surface related, and at the same time cautious way, 
we can see that we usually first have to figure out the quantificational form of N 
by looking at both expressions, N and P. The intended ‘unity’ expressed by the 
copula ‘is’ in ‘N is P’, must be found out. According to Hegel, we do this by an 
‘inference’ (German Schluss) that shows how the noun phrase N ‘coincides with’ 
or ‘fits to’ the verb phrase P. In other words, we first have to figure out the form 
of this coincidence, before we can say that we have understood the proposition 
and before we can make a (reflective) judgment about the truth (value) of the 
expressed proposition. Hegel’s idea seems to be that a ‘medium term’ or ‘medium 
proposition’ makes this unity explicit. It is a conceptual or generic unity. As such 
5 We can formally even demand for any sentence that it has the N ε P form and say that 
th e  we ath er  is rainy or that there is an e vent  having the property X — where X might be 
the property that it is my walking home or the sounding of your trumpet. But if we do so, we 
presuppose that the realms of objects or entities referred to by the variables (like weathers or 
states of bodies or events) are already defined. This means in turn that the corresponding cat-
egories of quantity for the corresponding variables are already presupposed. We want to know 
what this involves.
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it is not just a subjective way of dealing with N as if it were P or a mere a t t r i b u -
t i o n  of the expression of P to the subject term N.6 
We have seen that Hegel distinguishes between different quantificational 
status of N: the status of uni ver sality (Allgemeinheit), the status of genericity or 
particularity (Beson derheit) and the status or singularity (Einzelheit). Universal-
ity refers to all-quan tification, singularity to singular terms and singular objects. 
Generical judg ments form a ‘m e d i u m  r e a l m’ of terms and sentences. They 
talk about a member of a species ‘i n  i t s e l f ’, in the for mal or generical mode of 
Ansichsein. As such they determine the realm we talk about formally. They are 
presupposed in any definition of a realm for univer sal quantification. By a cer-
tain use of generic judgments we determine what it means to be a singular object 
in a set of objects. The example of talking about persons can show what is meant. 
It depends on the predicate, if dead persons or futures do count or not. Often 
they do not count, for example when we talk about the number of persons in 
a state. The form of being a living person determines then the relevant concept 
of a singular object or subject in the set of objects or subjects we talk about. It 
determines how to read a universal statement about a whole s e t  of persons. 
Indeed, statements of the mode ‘particularity’ or ‘genericity’ have a ‘mediat-
ing’ func tion when we have to de termine the meaning of a noun phrase like ‘the 
lion’ in its universal or singular use.7 In order to see this we look at a well known 
and widely discussed example from geometry. A sen tence like the following has 
two or three or more rea dings: “The circle has exactly one centre”. As a generic 
sen tence it says so me thing about the form of a circle. As a universal sentence it 
says so mething about all circles — as forms or as figures. As a sentence about 
a particular object it may say that t h i s  circle that you have drawn or you want 
to refer to has a centre — like all other circles. Many people seem to have similar 
problems in understanding the generic use of the sentence in claims about the 
ideal form of a circle as Protagoras and Sextus Empiricus and Hume obviously 
seem to have had. They all claim that there are no such forms. Any ‘real’ circle 
has indeed properties that contradict the list of ideal properties a mathematical 
circle is said to have. Nevertheless, Plato is right to claim that the ideal form 
determines the very meaning of any application of the word ‘circle’ in the realm 
of appearance in a kind of a priori way. We can put this insight into a more 
general form and say that generic statements determine the conceptual content 
of actual empirical claims. But we may admit that they do this in a way which 
remains ‘subjective’ in a certain sense. The rea son is that generic statements, 
though a priori in function with respect to sin gular empirical statements, still 
depend on a whole system of material know ledge and therefore can be subject 
6 Cf. Enc. § 179: “all things are a genus” and § 180: “the concept is the unity of subject 
and predicate, expressed by the empty ‘is’”.
7 Hegel’s Besonderheit does n o t  just refer to Aristotelian middle term in syllogisms as we 
shall see.
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to change. In a sense, generical state ments replace the so called synthetic a priori 
statements in Kant’s framework.8 
In any particular case we have to determine the ‘quantity’ of the noun phrase 
or subject N in the sentence in question. This includes a deter mination of the 
realm and of the relevant units (elements, objects) we (want to) talk about. We 
understand the logical status of N as a subject in a pro po sition only if we can 
relate it properly to a whole realm G of discourse and to the corresponding 
realm of objects g. This means, firstly, that a name has its determined meaning 
only in the context of a sentence or rather in the proposition expressed by the 
sentence. It means, secondly, that it has its determined meaning and reference 
only in relation to a whole realm of dis course. If we put this into a negative form, 
it means that names or singular terms do not name anything as such, but only in 
a holistic frame work. Their use as names presupposes the formation of a whole 
realm G as an already established realm of discourse. The units or objects of G 
can be singular empirical ob jects. They can be whole classes of objects or abstract 
objects or generic types or ge neral species. In any case we ha ve to know what to 
distinguish and what to identify. 
The determination of the relevant realm of discourse is mediated by a system 
of generic conceptual statements. The se statements articulate at the same time 
conceptual preconditions for understanding the sentence or proposition in 
question and they articulate material inferences that we are entitled to use by 
the proposition such understood.9 When Hegel says that any identity already 
c o n t a i n s  some dif fe ren ce, he expresses the fact that identities are always r e l a -
t i v e  to the r e  l e  v a n t  r e a l m  o f  d i s c o u r s e , more precisely, to the relevant 
predicates or di stinc tions that define the realm t o g e t h e r  with the concept of 
an ‘object’ in the realm. Objects of a realm are identified by n o t  m a k i n g  ‘finer’ 
differences or, rather, by not c o u n t i n g  certain differences, though possible, as 
r e l e v a n t  differen ces. This shows why a further reflection on the very concept 
of identity will lead us into the direction of a ‘dialectical’ l o g i c  o f  e s s e n c e 
a n d  r e l e v a n c e . 
The ‘results’ in Hegel’s d o c t r i n e  o f  b e i n g  are mainly negative: There 
is no absolute universe of discourse that comes with ‘immediate’ or ‘eternal’ 
identities. Ra ther, any objective reference to a world or realm of experience or to 
a world or realm of abstract entities presupposes a conceptual or logical constitu-
tion of the relevant objects of speech or thinking. It pre sup poses a determination 
8 The doctrine of essence is a sub jective doctrine of claims about generic statements by 
which we want to arti cu late the difference between mere appearances (as things for them-
selves) and what we say that the things essentially are (in them selves). The doctrine of con cept 
is a doctrine of the form of mediation in our talk about things ‘in and for themselves’.
9 In § 166, Zusätze, Hegel compares the status of a generic statement with the normal-
ity in which the germ of a plant develops into the full plant: of course, this does not happen 
a lway s . 
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of what counts as a possible name-like expression or a possible act of (deictical 
or anaphorical) naming. Since things change, it presupposes what it means to 
name the same or to name a different object in the realm, for example if there 
are different speakers with different ‘per spec tives’. It also presupposes that we 
know what counts as relevant ob ject-related predicates or ‘negations’ and what 
counts as a n e g a t i o n  o f  n e g a t i o n  in the realm. Such a negation of negation 
‘defines’ an appropriate equivalence relation between different ways the objects 
of the realm of discourse can be given to me and to you, now and then, here and 
there. Or rather, the strange expression ‘negation of negation’ tries to express the 
following logical fact: No predicate (i.e. ‘negation’) in the realm of discourse may 
be f i n e r  than the e q u i v a l e n c e  r e l a t i o n  that defines the i d e n t i t y  o f 
t h e  o b j e c t s  we want to talk about or to refer to.
4. REMARKS ON THE LOGIC OF ESSENCE AND CONCEPT 
4 . 1 .  S u b j e c t i v e  l o g i c  i n v e s t i g a t e s  t h e  p e r f o r m a t i v e 
f o r m  o f  s p e e c h  a c t s 
Hegel calls the d o c t r i n e  o f  e s s e n c e  and the d o c t r i n e  o f  c o n  c e p t 
‘subjective logic’. The reason is this: He takes the fact seriously that any actual 
speech act has a spea ker. Hence, we find here, for the first time in the history of 
logic, the deep insight that there is no free-floating situation-invariant mea ning. 
Moreover, we cannot attach such a meaning to sen tences as syntactic figures that 
can be used at will. Rather, the use of the sentences is floating. 
This claim is directed against a basic prejudice in a logicist or rationalistic 
tradition that leads from Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz to Rudolf Carnap. If we 
want to understand the real constitution of meaning and truth, real content and 
actual knowledge, we cannot abstract from the fact that meaning requires speech 
acts. The view from nowhere on pure sen tence-meaning as we de fi ne it in pure 
mathematics by merely verbal or figuratives schemes of infe ren tial opera tions 
is not good enough for ex pressing any relation to the real world of things and 
other persons. Plato addresses this problem already in his dialogue Parmenides 
(but in the Kratylus, Phaedrus, Theaetetus and Sophist, too). It is t h e  problem 
of any formal semantic, not on ly of Plato’s early theory of forms: A ‘world’ of 
purely formal or mathematical objects and truths is still w i t h o u t  s e n s e  in 
Kant’s sense of the word ‘sen se’. I.e. it does not have the proper relation to the 
real world of ac tual and possible experience yet. 
But a merely subjective approach with respect to perception and dispo sitional 
attitude does not help, as the problems of empiricism show. John Locke, for 
example, takes an objective stance when he makes his claims about the subjec-
tive form of human understanding. He wants to ground it on the foundation 
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of sense-perception and on a set of mental operations. But such a claim about 
how human understanding allegedly works is in itself dogmatic. Locke forgets to 
reflect on the episte mo logical status of his own speech acts. It is much less clear 
what it means to say that the picture he draws is true than his modern followers 
in the cognitive sciences seem to believe. Hume, on the other hand, only seems 
to be skeptical in this respect. He also claims to know something about real 
truth and about the development of actual beliefs. He claims to know something 
about the leading role of desires in human behavior and that this behavior is ‘es-
sentially’ of the same form as we can see it in animal behavior. The que stion is 
on what grounds we should believe such a claim, especially be cau se it is not an 
empirical claim at all but a normative one. It says that an obviously important 
distinction between animal cognition and human know led ge allegedly is not 
‘essential’. But this is in itself a value statement. For it is just plain nonsense to 
claim that such a distinction does not have to be made or cannot be made. 
In comparison to Socratic skepticism, i.e. to a reflection on the status of one 
own’s speech acts (including those of skeptical doubts), Hume is not skeptical 
enough. That means, he forgets to focus on the presup positions of his own 
doubts and claims, even when he seems to give only ‘prag matical’ answers with 
respect to what is reasonable to say or to believe. This shows in a stenographic 
form why philosophical reflection cannot begin with an em piricist, Humean, 
version of so-called Cartesian skepticism. 
When we remember that Hegel had called the first part of his logic, the 
Doctrine of being, ‘objective’ logic, we now can see a deep irony or ambivalence 
in this title. The reason is that this d o c t r i n e  o f  b e i n g  never leaves the 
realm of absolutely abstract forms of speech and thinking. The core topic is 
pure mathematics. The last chapter on measure ment shows that we have to 
leave this realm of purely formal discourse when we want to talk about the real 
world. Measurement is the prototype for a projection of abstract forms onto real 
experience. But this experience is not immediate sense-perception. It is already 
a joint practice of developing and con trolling inter-subjective knowledge. The 
dialogical and dialectical, i.e. so cial and historical, form of this development is 
the topic of Hegel’s d o c t r i n e  o f  e s s e n c e . 
The d o c t r i n e  o f  c o n c e p t  is a most difficult doctrine. It reflects on what 
we address when we talk about ‘eternal’ know ledge, ‘infinite’ truth and ‘ob jective’ 
concepts or meanings. The answer is that we address t h e  human form of life as 
a frame for any particular forms of life. It is whole life, in which particular de-
velopments of human practices take place. In the doctrine of concept, the topic 
is the most general form of conceptual thinking and content. It is a ‘speculative’ 
i.e. highest-level, analysis of the very idea of con ceptual understanding and the 
very form of human knowledge.
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4 . 2 .  E s s e n c e  i s  a  r e s u l t  o f  g o o d  j u d g m e n t s 
a b o u t  r e l e v a n c e 
We need an analysis of the form we use when we project our logical forms of 
speech onto the real world of experience. The question is this: How do we 
identify empirical objects and properties in real Anschauung? The objects must 
be ‘sub stances‘ that allow not only for some change of their properties in the 
course of events, but also for dif ferent perspectives on the substan ces themselves 
in relation to different observers and speakers. This shows why a merely abstract 
analysis of substantive matter, as we find it in Spi noza, does not suffice. The di-
stinction between being in itself (Ansichsein) and being for itself (Fürsichsein), 
i.e. the di stinction between a mere ab stract f o r m  or type (of speech) and an 
individual token, given, for example, by deictical reference, becomes crucial here: 
Any sufficiently inva riant ob ject of c o n c r e t e  under standing is already of the 
category An-und-Für-Sich-Sein, of being i n - a n d - f o r - i t s e l f . Hegel sees that 
neither rationalism nor empiricism has provided a satisfactory analysis for this. 
Kant has achieved much on this way, but Hegel is not satisfied with the form 
Kant presents his ideas, namely just by presupposing the model of Newton’s 
mechanics and projecting it onto our ‘normal’ talk about things. 
At the end of the chapter on measure, Hegel argues ex negativo in order to 
show why a new approach in a d o c t r i n e  o f  e s s e n c e  is needed. A basic 
problem is how to determine ‘substantive things’, about which we can talk in an 
‘objective’ way. Hegel criticizes Spinoza for his all too abstract answer: 
The difference (of the substances PSW) is […] not understood in its qualitative aspect, 
substance is not determined as that which distinguishes itself, i.e. not as (the) subject 
(of a proposition PSW).10
A substance is an object of reference of a possible singular term in a predica-
tive proposition. If we use such a naming term we presuppose that it is possible to 
judge about identity and difference of the object and all the objects in the whole 
realm or system referred to, namely on the ground of qualitative judgments. 
Hegel’s term for substantial thing-identity is, as we know already, ‘attraction’, 
for thing-difference it is ‘repulsion’. The word ‘attraction’ refers to a sufficiently 
stable identity, the word ‘repulsion’ refers to a sufficiently stable relation of in-
equality11 that defines the elements of a set of objects. 
10 GW 21, p. 381: “Der Unterschied (der Substanzen) ist […] nicht qualitativ aufgefasst, 
die Substanz nicht als das sich selbst unterscheidende, nicht als Subjekt bestimmt”.
11 The word “repulsion” and the word “attraction” refer in its general use not to physical 
forces, but to the inequality and equality of objects as two sides of one categorical form of 
being an element or an object in a set of objects. Any real reference to an object in experience 
must fulfill the corresponding form. Cf. GW 21, p. 166 ff.
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The word ‘essence’ is a title for the category by which we answer the question 
“what was it really that you or she or they were talking about”? The essence is, 
therefore, the to ti en einai of Aristotle, the that-what-it-was-to- be. If we ask, for 
example, what the ‘real reference’ of a term N is, and when we try to answer the 
question, we use this logical form. The same holds if I ask if a claim p really is 
true and start to answer the question. The major point is that in any such answer 
we have to take the different per spec tives of the speaker(s) and hearer(s) into 
account. On the other hand, any answer I give still is my answer. I remain the 
speaker. All objectivity claims are objectivity claims of individual speakers. Any 
understanding is, first and foremost, subjective understanding. Any judgment 
about some good or bad, a real or rea sonab le understanding of a term or a text is 
a judgment of a subject, e.g. my judgment. There is no free floating sentence or 
proposition that could be true totally independent of a possible speaker. There is 
no view from nowhere. Truth is always a subjective matter, even when I claim to 
know its objectivity. In a sense, we may say properly that it is an inter-subjective 
matter. Hegel analyses this subjective form of truth in his doctrine of essence 
which he therefore calls, with the best reason of the world, ‘subjective logic’. 
The following sentence leads from a doctrine of being to a doctrine of essence: 
“The absolute indifference is the last determination of being before it turns into 
essence.”12 
The idea seems to be this. As long as we do not understand that the dif ference 
of substances must be a qualitative difference with respect to a possible observer 
in actual or possible Anschauung, no particular deter mination of a substantive 
thing is available whatsoever.13 As a result, the concept of a substance becomes 
totally empty. If we would say “p u r e  q u a n t i t y  i s  i n d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h e 
s e n s e  t h a t  i t  i s  o p e n  t o  a n y  d e t e r  m i n a t i o n”,14 we would refer only 
to the f o r m  of being a substance or rather to the form of our use of a singular 
term in a noun phrase. If all determination of the object referred to would be 
still open, the subject of the sentence or proposition would be no more than 
a pure variable. But if we attach properties only to variables, we do not make 
judgments. 
Some philosophers may want to follow Hume and try to understand objects 
or things as bundles of qualities or properties. But free-floating qualities do not 
exist. And properties should at least in the end be properties of objects. As such, 
they should not be confused with pure qualitative distinctions in the realm of 
sensations. Qualities of sensations are no good foundations for a logical Aufbau 
of an objective world. To show this had been the topic of Hegel’s Phenomenol-
12 GW 21, p. 381: Die absolute Indifferenz ist die letzte Bestimmung des Seins, ehe dieses 
zum Wesen wird. 
13 But the assumption leads to nothing. As long as noch keine Art von Bestimmtheit sein 
soll (GW 21, p. 373), we do not know what we refer to.
14 Die reine Quantität ist die Indifferenz als aller Bestimmungen fähig (GW 21, p. 381).
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ogy of spirit. The concept of essence has therefore to be developed in a way that 
we can overcome the wrong idea that a substance could be determined imme-
diately. 
When we ask for the essence of something we ask for relevant presup po si-
tions. The same holds when we ask for the real reference of a name and the real 
truth of a proposition. Any answer to such question is subjective: I say emphati-
cally what we should and can count as essential and real. The same holds for 
answers to questions concerning a rea sonable compre hension of the meaning 
of words, the reference of singular terms or the properties of predicates in their 
relations to the objects named. This opens the floor for the questions what we 
can know and how I can talk for us. The doctrine of essence is an analysis of the 
constitution of joint reference on the basis of individual judgments. Its main 
task is to analyze presupposed transformations of my perspective to yours or hers 
or theirs. In these cases we indeed often use emphatic expressions like ‘really’, 
‘objectively’ or ‘reasonably’. It is a complicated question how the mere emphatic 
and pa ro chial sense or ‘really’ as an ‘advertisement’ of my judgment turns into 
a more urban sense of an appeal to a kind of ‘we-reason’.15 
Narrowly related to this problem is the question what it means to say that 
some knowledge is ‘better’ than another is or that a certain knowledge claim is 
superficial. Standard examples are cases when I know that a stick in the water 
only looks bended, but you, perhaps, do not know it; or when you, standing in 
front of a barn façade, think it is a barn, but I know from my perspective that it 
is not — or at least that you cannot know it. In such cases I (or we) say that my 
(or our) ‘new’ judgments determine what there really is, whereas your ‘old’ judg-
ment was wrong, an error. When we talk that way, we distinguish being from 
seeming, reality and objectivity from mere appearance. 
But any such ‘new’ and ‘revisionist’ judgment presupposes at least some thing 
about the old judgment, as Hegel notices. It is a relative judg ment by its very 
logical form. On the other hand, the new explanations or the new knowledge 
often changes only some moments or aspects in the old pic ture: The stick is not 
bended, but it is true that it appears to be bended. The façade looks like a barn-
façade, but there is no real barn behind (or the re is, but ‘only by chance’). As we 
can see here, revisions of old judg ments are similar to revision of reference from 
my perspective with respect to other perspectives. Hume and Protagoras think 
that they talk about geo metrical forms, but in reality they talk about mere fig-
ures or gestalts. A phy sicist may think that he talks about local and infinitesimal 
impulses as peculiar dynamical forces, but in reality he only talks about moments 
in our ways of describing generic movements in a mathematical framework. 
15 We all know that only in very excep tional cases a singular person can be right in his jud-
gments against the overwhelming consent of almost all others — like Hegel seems to me in 
some aspects, despite the deep problems of making himself understood. 
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We might take the difference between Isaack Newton’s Mechanics and Al-
bert Einstein’s Relativity Theory as an example. The new theory changes many 
things. But it also leaves many things unchanged. Indeed, no successful real ex-
planation of classical mechanics is chan ged. The reason is this. The external ap-
plications of Newton’s mechanics is much less fine-grained than people usually 
think. The new theory also needs external judgments and a distinction between 
relevant approximations and irrelevant, all too fine, differentiations that surpass 
the realm of relevant margins of error of the method of measurement used. 
More general, the ‘new’ explanations or corrections are reasonable only if they 
solve problems for which a new solution is necessary, needed, ‘not-wendig’. This 
is a conceptual principle that defines the concept of a rea so nable development of 
any science and knowledge, of any prac tice and institution. If we do not care for 
the principle we already have left the idea and project of science and the idea of 
reason. If ‘revolutions’ in the sciences and in human institutions at large should 
be reasonable we should under stand why they are necessary, i.e. what needs are 
fulfilled and what pro blems are solved. If there is no answer to this question, the 
development is no progress and should not be judged as reasonable. Not every 
change in language, theory or method inside or outside of science can count as 
a progress. Notice that if a development is necessary in this sense this does not 
mean that things could not have developed otherwise. 
4 . 3 .  J u d g m e n t  a n d  i n f e r e n c e  a r e  a l w a y s  s i t u a t e d 
i n  a  s y s t e m  o f  c o n c e p t s 
Another difficult part of Hegel’s logic is his teaching about judgment and infe-
rence in his doctrine of concept. It seems at first as if Hegel thinks of classical syl-
logisms when he talks about three figures of syllogistic reasoning. The following 
considerations try to show that his understanding of inference is fairly different 
from any usual reading of Aristotelian logics of syllogistic deduction. My claim 
is that Hegel is not so much concerned with deductive logic, but with the form 
of generic predication ‘N is P’. 
Aristotle distinguishes t h r e e  f i g u r e s  o f  s y l l o g i s m s  according to the 
following scheme. For him, the basic syllogism is of the following form:
(*) If A contains B and B contains C, then A contains C — i.e. if all B are 
A and all C are B then all C are A.
It is the syllogistic mode called ‘Barbara’. This is a syllogism of the f i r s t 
f i g u r e . In it, the middle term B is in one premise the subject, in the other it is 
the predicate. An example for a syllogism of the s e c o n d  f i g u r e  according to 
Aristotle would be :
(**) If A contains B and C contains B, then some A are C (and some C are A).
In a syllogism of the second figure, the middle term B is, as we would say, 
the subject of the sentence in both premises. The t h i r d  f i g u r e,  in which the 
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middle term is in both premises the predicate, does not contain a valid inference 
in the standard form of all-quantification. If A is B and C is B then A may be 
contingently C. But this does not follow with necessity. In the third figure, we 
arrive at a valid inference only if we make use of a negated copula, as Aristotle 
indeed does. If, for example, some A are not B and all C are B then some A are 
not C. Aristotle presupposes that A, B, C refer to non-empty sets and he uses 
four different copula, as his mediaeval readers have realized, namely AaB, AiB, 
AoB, AeB. These forms read respectively: all B are A, some B are A, some B are 
not A, all B are not A. Notice, by the way, that the order of pre dication is reversed 
if we think of the normal order of ‘is’ from left to right. Aristotelian syllogisms 
are valid deductive rules in termino logical trees and Euler-diagrams. As I have 
shown elsewhere (STEKELER-WEITHOFER 1986, part 1), Aristotle presents 
a com ple te and consistent set of inference rules with respect to his intended se-
mantics of extensional relations between non-empty one-place predica tes. As we 
see, for Aristotle, the letters A, B, C do not refer to different cate gories. 
Hegel does not think of his ‘syllogisms’ in an Aristotelian or deductive way at 
all. His distinction of three ‘syllogistic’ figures does not have much more in com-
mon with the figures of Aristotle than the name. At least the resulting ambigui-
ties are rightly criticized by Trendelenburg and others. But let us look at Hegel’s 
three figures of ‘inference’, for which he uses the following symbols: S–P–U, U–
S–P, and P–U–S. These figures of inference are defined by the quantificational 
status of the ‘me dia ting term’ and not, as in Aristotle, by the syntactic form of 
the two premises. S stands for ‘singular’, P for ‘particular’ and U for ‘universal’. 
At first glance, there seem to be at least some similarities to Aristotle’s procedure. 
In the first figure S–P–U, the medium term, which is a predicate in the first 
premise, turns into a subject in the second. The inference form ‘Barbara’ seems 
to be of this first figure: 
(S–P–U): If (all) S is P and (all) P is U then (all) S is U. 
But I think that the form (S–P–U) of ‘qualitative’ syllogisms in Hegel’s ap-
proach contains all valid syllogistic inferences. The form represent all formal in-
ferences of ‘understan ding’ i.e. all valid schemes of logical deductions. Hegel calls 
these qualitative inferences also “inferen ces of presence” (or rather: of existence 
or Dasein) (Enc. §183). He notices that in such inferences the pre mises already 
contain the conclusions, so that the main problem is where we get the premises 
from. I.e. how do we prove a quantified statement of the form (all) N is P? 
One way to arrive at such a quantified statement is the i n f e r e n c e  o f  i n -
d u c t i o n . Hegel says that P–S–U is the figure of such a syllogism of induction 
— which would be a fourth figure, if the order of P–S–U and U–S–P would 
matter. It does not.16 The inference of induction has the following form: 
16 Induction is a syllogism of reflection (Enc. § 190): Here, the middle terms have the 
status of singularity, they name singular things.
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(P–S–U): If any singular case N of a species P has a property U, then all cases 
falling under P have the property U. This is just the inductive introduction rule 
for all-quantification.
Another way to arrive at general statements is the inference of analogy. This 
is an inference in which we use individual examples in order to show generic 
properties in a synecdochic way. Here, the mediating terms name individual 
cases. But particular properties of these cases are turned into universal features 
of a generic concept or species. The corresponding form of ‘inference’ is the 
form (U–S–P):
(U–S–P): A singular case S shows a universal feature U, which can be ex-
pressed by a generic statement that has the status of particularity and expresses 
an essential form of a species of things. 
At first, this sounds strange. But the situation is well known from the case, in 
which we use a singular figure in geometry for proving a general statement about 
the corresponding geometrical form. Since Plato’s time, we call such inferences 
‘epagogical’. We could call them as well ‘analogical’. The term ‘analogy’ means 
‘equality of expressions’. It articulates the fact that we use the same expressions 
for referring to the form (of a circle, for example) and the singular instance (an 
actual figure representing the form). Plato and Hegel would agree against all em-
piricists that analogical argu ments, by which we show general features, mediated 
by singular cases, are of a different form than inductions. Induction leads to uni-
versally quan tified statements. Analogical arguments lead to generic statements. 
Never theless, they both belong to the same figure of inferential reasoning, the 
inference of reflection, because the mediating term has the quantificational 
status of singularity. Hegel’s second figure (U–S–P) is formally characterized by 
the fact that an individual subject S has ‘two’ properties U and P, which turn out 
to be one property: It is a property that could be taken as a universal property 
of any individual subject of a certain class of object (in the mode U), but at the 
same time as a ‘generical’ property of a species (in the mode P). The label ‘infer-
ence of reflection’ alludes to Kant’s reflective judgments, which also have the 
feature that singular cases show general properties. 
The peculiar status of generic statements demands careful judgments when 
we want to apply them to individual cases. They are not per se universal state-
ments. A species is not merely a set of individuals. If we look at an individual 
case, we first have to check if the normality conditions apply that are prerequisite 
for any transformation of generic statements about forms in a species of forms 
into a universal sta tements about a set of individuals. The paradigm case is (once 
again since Plato’s time) the transformation of statements about geometrical 
forms into statements about geometrical figures or bodies. 
Moreover, since we know that the realm of generic statements was the result 
of ‘epagogic’ reasoning or analogical inference, we know that we are allowed to 
make changes in our system of generic judgments about the species in question, 
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for example when we learn more about the form of being a member in the species 
P. Never theless, these generic statement have the status of conceptual statements 
about the species P. They ex press inferences we may make use of when ever we 
talk of singular cases of the species P — after we have addressed the case as a case 
of this generic form. We do this on the ground of a judgment that says that the 
singular case is a good enough example of the generic case. 
When I say, for example, that the shape of France is hexagonal, I make a cer-
tain claim by which I entitle you to a certain set of inferential conse quen ces. 
My com mitment and your entitlement is, however, not independent of good 
judgments about a relevant and good enough application of the word ‘hexago-
nal’ in the case of shapes of countries. If I say, to take another example, that the 
movement of the earth around the sun is circular, you may be right to say that 
it is not circular but elliptic. The relations between the generic cases and the 
singular cases are v e r y  complicated if we look at them in detail. The important 
point for us here is that no objective empirical know ledge can be articulated if 
not by implicit refe ren ce to generic cases. Or rather, the concept of in variant 
truth and knowledge is defined on the generic level, not on the level of immedi-
ate individual presence in which we articulate qualitative distinctions like: “this 
rose is red”. 
But what is the meaning and use of Hegel’s third figure (P–U–S)? Here, a sin-
gular and a particular subject seem to fall under a common universal predicate. 
The universal is the mediating level for the singular and the par ticular. In my 
opinion, we can explain how Hegel thinks of presuppositional inferences if we 
look at the following examples: 
(1) 2:7 is the same as 4:14. 
(2) The circle has a centre.
(3) God is good.
In our understanding of these sentences, we have to reconstruct their ‘infe-
ren tial contexts’. 2:7 is the same proportion as 4:14. In other words, it is pre-
sup posed that we talk in (1) about proportions or rational or real numbers, not 
about ratios. In (2), the expression ‘the circle’ refers to one and only one form 
if the implicit ‘pre mise’ in an inferential context is “The circle is a form”. Hav-
ing a centre is a form also. It is a sub-form or ‘moment’ of a form. In (3), the 
inferential context may be “God is a speculative concept referring to the form 
of the world” or “being good is a speculative concept referring to the form of 
judgments”. The sentence then says that these forms are, in a certain respect, the 
same. This is the only way how I can make sense of Hegel’s claim in Enc. § 191. 
There he says that, in an inference or syllogism of necessity, the middle term 
has the status of universality.17 My basic claim now is this: in Hegel’s doctrine 
17 A judgment of necessity ‘N is P’ (in the sense of Enc. § 177) is a result or consequence 
of such an inference. Such a judgment ‘N is P’ says that the predicate contains or articulates 
the nature or essence of the subject N.
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of concept, the status of being a synthetic a priori sentence as we know it from 
Kant is dissolved. It is replaced by the status of a generic sentence that articulates 
a form of a species of things. The system of these sentences contains much more, 
and different, sentences or propositions than Kant’s class of synthetic a priori 
truths. It contains all the sentences that we develop in the sciences and encyclo-
paedias. We use them in an a priori way when we structure our own individual 
ex pe rience or rather our empirical access to the world. With respect to empirical 
propositions, generic judgments are (relatively) a priori.18 They determine the 
very con tent of concepts. They do this in a holistic and systematic way. 
Even though generic statements are, in a certain sense, pre suppositions of 
empirical judgments, and, therefore, cannot be immedia tely corroborated or 
refuted by singular empirical observation, they are not totally eter nal, nor are 
they independent from experience. On the contrary. They are de velo ped in 
the realm of experience or rather, in the progress and project of experimentally 
controlled joint knowledge. When we talk of ‘eternal’ truth and meaning, we 
talk about t h e  f o r m  of the standing sentences by which we make inferences 
explicit that are ‘material’ and at the same time ‘conceptual’. The real ‘infinity’ 
or ‘eternity’ is the form of the project as such, not the actual form in any actual 
system of knowledge.
If I am right, then Hegel’s avoidance of Kant’s notion of synthetic a priori 
judgments is, at the same time, analogous and very much different to Willard 
Van Orman Quine’s dissolution of the analytic-synthetic-distinction in Car-
nap’s Logical Empiricism. In the following respect Quine and Hegel use similar 
distinctions: both want to diffe rentiate between the logical status of individual 
empirical judgments of the ‘observational’ form: “this rose of there is red” or 
“this tree over there is green” and generic judgments of the form “roses can be 
red, white and yellow, but not green” or “trees in spring are green”. The latter are 
Quine’s ‘standing sentences’. Moreover, Hegel and Quine share a holistic point of 
view. But they differ already in their at ti tude to these standing sentences. Hegel 
understands them not as universal empirical claims about merely ‘contingent 
facts’, but as generic articulations of material, nevertheless ‘conceptual’, infer-
ences. Hegel can do so because he, but not Quine, sees the distinction be tween 
universal quantifications of the form ‘any indivi dual in a set N has the property 
P’ and the generic reading of a sentence of the form ‘N is P’. This reading asks 
from any ‘hearer’ not to use the sentence thoughtlessly, schematically, but to 
make autono mous judgments about its proper use in any singular occasion. 
18 Hegel distinguishes empirical or ‘qualitative’ propositions like “this rose is red” or “Cae-
sar was born then and there” or “there is a carriage driving by” (§167, 172) from generic judg-
ments, but also from emphatic judgments of the form: “the noise was produced by a carriage 
that was driving by”. Qualitative judgments of the category Dasein (or ‘presence’) say what is 
h ere . They contain deictic elements or situation-dependent anaphoric references. 
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Hume had been right to say that no schematic and universal inference rule is 
sufficiently justified by individual observations. But this fact should not mislead 
us into a skeptical theory of radical indeterminacy of meaning and conceptual 
inference. It rather should convince us that we need another understanding of 
conceptual inferences. They are not universal, quantified, schemes of deduc-
tions. They rather are articulations of generic knowledge and default rules of 
inference. 
As far as Robert Brandom reads Hegel in this way, I fully support his reading. 
As far as he thinks of logical inferences as formal, schematic, inferences that can 
be represented by a system of formal deductions or formal norms of dialogical 
commitments, entitlement and ‘consistency’ I do not. In formal systems of in-
ferential rules we only can make ‘universal’ quantification explicit, but not the 
much more complicated practice of generic reasoning. 
Without implicit reference to a whole framework of conceptual forms, there 
cannot be any reference to an empirical object at all. This fact shows a deep prob-
lem with the use of the words ‘empiri cal’ and ‘experience’. Quine’s empiri cism 
still falls prey to a deep rooted dogmatism in the tradition of Locke and Hume, 
even though Quine wants to overcome the traditional idea of ‘rationalism’, 
which wants to distin guish formal rules of analytical inferences from material 
inferences that already ‘have’ empirical content — or rather define the notion 
of content, as we could say in the spirit of Brandom’s approach. To show this in 
detail, especially when it comes to the status of generic statements, would need 
a more thorough investigation. But the general point can be seen already now: 
We use generic sentences as conceptual truths. They are not merely ana ly tically 
true sentences in the sense that they are made true by arbitrary de finitional stipu-
lations in a deductive language game as we know it from wor king with axiomatic 
deductive systems. Rather, the generic sentences ar ti culate material distinctions 
and default inferences that are connected to such distinctions. We may think, 
for example, of sentences like the fol lo wing:
(1) Birds have feathers.
(2) Man can speak. 
(3) What lives, dies. 
(4) Most birds can fly.
(5) Most people can calculate.
None of these sentences expresses singular e m p i r i c a l  f a c t s  as, for ex-
ample, the fact that little Peter cannot speak yet or that the bird Peewee, being 
a penguin, cannot fly. Sentences like: 
(6) Babies under 8 months cannot speak. 
(7) Penguins cannot fly.
are also not ‘empirical’ but conceptual. We arrive at them by a judgment of 
reflec tion: We need to find the appropriate subclass that turns the merely sin-
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gular proposition about Peter or Peewee into a generic statement.19 These state-
ments alone express some objective ‘experience’ (Erfahrung) in Kant’s sen se. As 
such, they are presupposed when we talk about baby boy Peter or our penguin 
Peewee, just as we presuppose that any living being will die, if we like it or not, 
just because the very concept of life includes, as Hegel would say, its opposite, 
namely death, in exactly the sense, which turns (3) into a conceptual statement. 
But (2) is a conceptual statement also, even though not only our toddler Peter 
may not speak yet but some adults are, as we know, also incapable of using lan-
guage. This empirical fact does not refute the generic truth. It rather shows that 
applications of generic (or conceptual) truths in singular empirical cases still 
require good, experienced, judgments. 
Such judgments answer to the question if normal conditions for applying the 
conceptual truth are fulfilled. Conceptual truths cannot be applied ‘blindly’ or 
‘thoughtlessly’. Their proper use has to be checked in a ‘judgment of concept’, by 
which we determine if an empirical subject is ‘a good enough’ example of a con-
ceptual determination or if it ‘truly’ falls under the concept.20 According to this 
understanding, pre dication is not just a subjective attribution of a predicate to 
the subject. The speaker does say that the subject has the property expressed by 
the predicate21 or, as Hegel says, that sub ject and predicate are ‘identical’ (§ 166). 
This way to read the ‘is’ as an iden tity seems to be weird, especially because we 
would want to take sides with Kant and Frege against Hegel and distinguish 
predication from identity. But according to Hegel, a sentence like 
(8) Peewee is a penguin
says that the creature I refer to by the name ‘Peewee’ can be referred to by 
the name ‘this penguin’ as well. Hegel’s ‘identity theory’ of predication says 
not much more than this: What we refer to by N can be referred to by P as 
well and vice versa. Hegel does not care for the fact that we have to change the 
syntactic form of P when we want to do this and turn it into a ‘singular term’ 
denoting ‘locally’ the same as N. This shows, once again, that Hegel is not at all 
interested in formal deductive logic. Nevertheless, Hegel’s reading of the copula 
19 Cf. Enc. § 174: In a judgment of reflection the singular is already related to other things 
in the world. And this is expressed by a predicate that is not defined in its truth conditions 
by relatively immediate qualities. Hegel’s example is the predicated ‘curative’. In § 175 he says 
that particularity is extended to a kind of universality, the generic statements about normal 
behavior turn into all-quantification about all things that behave normal.
20 Cf. Enc. § 178: A judgment of concept says if some judgment is good or true enough — 
with respect to the conceptual or generic inferences in question. 
21 Cf. §§ 166, 167. The problem is, of course, to explain the objective sense of a claim 
that N is P. The answer is that the object N itself is determined by P and that the speaker as 
a subject says that this holds objectively, independently of his subjective judgment. I.e. the 
speaker makes an appeal to an objective realm of ‘conceptual’ truth to which he is and remains 
committed. 
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‘is’ as a kind of identity can be helpful, especially in an analysis of ‘speculative’ 
sentences like 
(9) God is the all-mighty, the all-knowing and the all-good.
For Hegel, a sentence like this does not say that there is an individual entity 
called “god” having the transcendent properties of being at the same time all-
mighty, all-knowing and all-good. When we want to understand the sentence, 
we rather have to figure out first how the relation of the noun phrase N and the 
predicate P in the sentence N(P) has to be read. Hegel’s answer is this. We use 
the word ‘god’ in order to articulate the ‘infinite’ idea of power of existence or 
of possibility, of knowing or truth, and of goodness in forms of life. We do so in 
a metonymic way. In other words, (9) is a d e f i n i t i o n  for a certain use of the 
word ‘god’. Since we always have to reflect on the subjects who make judgments 
about existence and possibility, knowledge and goodness, it is not even bad that 
god has personal features. But we should not misread speculative sentences of 
this sort as if they were talking about a ‘finite’ being and not about an idea or 
ideal form. 
Hegel never cares for details, to the c h a g r i n  or annoyance of any formal 
logician, to be sure. On the other hand we better keep in mind what Hegel ad-
dresses and what he thinks to be relevant. Formal deductions and formal defini-
tions as we use them in mathe matics or in terminological trees of taxonomical 
science since the times of Ari sto tle are not in the focus of his logic. The par-
ticular technique of defining the differential and inferential meaning of a verb 
phrase or predicate P by using recursive schemes of reduction is not the topic of 
his philosophical logic at all. Indeed, we may use any scheme of definition we 
feel happy to use. But we should not over estimate the place of formal defi ni tions: 
They allow for a system of intra-language inferences that can be lear ned to be 
handled schematically. They might help us to make implicit inferen ces explicit, 
as Brandom says. But they do not tell us anything about the status of the material 
inferences that are made explicit by them. 
Even though I think that a projection of Brandom’s ideas in Making it ex plicit 
onto Hegel’s Logic is perfectly legitimate and may help us to improve our under-
standing of his ideas of subjective and inter-subjective differen tiations and infer-
ential commitments, entitlements and ‘contra dic tions’, there are essential limits 
in this way of seeing things. The que stions of Hegel’s philosophical logic lie far 
beyond or rather far below any f o r m a l  technique of making differentiations 
and rules of inferences explicit. More importantly, Hegel does not ‘explain’ how 
it can come about that we can use ‘joint’ concepts. He rather reflects on what 
we usually do when we use concepts. I.e. the form of analysis is presuppositional, 
transcendental, not expla na tional.
What Hegel cares for most seems to be the way we have to determine not 
only the relation between N and P in sentences of the form ‘N is P’ but the very 
reading of N and P in such a sentence. His answer is that we have to determine 
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the reading of N in dependence of the reading of P and vice versa. I.e. we do not 
build up the meaning or truth condition of (‘elemen tary’) sentences from inde-
pen dent atomic parts, N and P, just by putting the copula ‘is’ between them. 
The copula is no relation between independently determined things, namely 
subjects and predicates. Rather, the copula is a sign to look for the ‘identity’ of 
N and P, i.e. for the realm in which N either names a singular object or refers to 
a whole class of such objects and in which P defines a subclass — or for a generic 
or conceptual reading of N. In the first case we say by the sentence that the object 
named by N has the property P, in the second case we say that all the Ns have the 
property. We have to figure out the ‘identical’ realm for N and P in the case of 
empirical propositions. And we have to figure out the relevant species in the case 
of conceptual propositions. We do this on the ground of some kind of ‘inferen-
ces’ or ‘syllogisms’, i.e. by searching for mediating terms or propositions. 
The mediating terms or propositions can be of the status particularity, sin-
gularity, and universality. In the first case, the mediation between N and P is 
a system of generic know ledge. In the second case, the mediation is of the form of 
an analogy or an induction and the resulting proposition is a generic statement. 
In the third case, the mediation is of the status of universality. The result is a par-
ticular judgment. Any particular form or generic knowledge is still a mere mo-
ment in a development of the system of concepts, which Hegel calls ‘the concept’ 
and at the same time ‘the object’.22 He does so because he is willing to use generic 
or rather ‘speculative’ sentences like “the concept is the absolute” or “god is the 
absolute” or “the concept is god” anyway. I certainly would prefer to avoid this 
form of speech even though it is used in theological seminars until today. I prefer 
translations into more urban languages. In order to show how I see things I look 
at Hegel’s defense of the ontological proof of the existence of god. 
(10) God exists.
(11) God is the system of all concepts. 
(12) The system of all concepts includes existence, since it is the very realm 
in which it is determined what exists and what not. 
Obviously, Hegel does not think that a concept is a finite predicate of the 
form ‘having 30 dollar in the pocket’. He rather thinks of a whole practice of 
making distinctions in the world as it is presupposed in any finite or em pirical 
distinction. He claims that Anselm’s or Descartes’ version of the onto logical 
proof of the existence of god can be understood as a conceptual statement about 
what we do when we talk about god. We want to talk about the whole system 
of being and understanding and truth. This system is the ‘greatest’ object we 
can think about. It is the very concept of existence and truth, being, essence and 
concept. As a result, Hegel claims that traditional theology is just an early and 
22 This rather strange way of identifying the object with the whole of all its relations to 
other objects goes back to the monadology of Leibniz. It explains why in the end the object in 
this all-inclusive sense is god.
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underdeveloped version to do logic. It has to be freed from a dogmatic and mis-
leading ontic understanding of the word ‘god’. The real and good form of doing 
theology is — abandoning it and doing conceptual analysis of the human form 
of life, together with a logical analysis of the various forms to make this form 
verbally explicit and develop our autonomy by doing so. Brandom is therefore 
absolutely right to stress the importance of logical analysis for explicit conscious-
ness and self-knowledge. The only point of possible differences concern the 
question what logical analysis is and what it is good for.
After turning away from mythological theology, we can, if we wish, still use 
the word ‘god’. But we must know that if we say that god exists or that god is the 
truth or that god is good we do not say that there is an entity called ‘god’ that 
has a property like existing or telling the truth in a bible. Nor is it right to say 
that God is good ‘to his creatures’. Rather, we use the word ‘god’ in a metonymic 
way in order to talk about the idea of absolute truth, absolute being or existence 
or, when it comes to questions of ethics, absolute goodness. When we do so, we 
refer to the whole project of de ve loping human practice. But what is the ‘truth’ 
of ‘speculative’ statements on this ‘absolute’ level of reflection on being, truth 
and know ledge? This question does not only concern traditional theology. 
When, for example, the physical sciences claim to have an absolute concept of 
truth or present the only real know led ge or the real world, Hegel attacks this 
materialist or physicalist view under the title ‘mechanism’ as wrong metaphysics. 
It represents a wrong un derstanding of the doctrine of absolute truth, knowledge 
and nature. The ‘real’ truth of me cha nism as a form of explanation of nature is 
that it is only a province in human instrumental reasoning, which is, in turn, 
only a province in human ethical life. In other words, atomistic materialists and 
decision theorists as Thomas Hobbes are pro vincial thinkers, just because they 
claim that their limited concept of nature contained the whole world and that 
their limited and subjectivist concept of rationality contained the whole concept 
of human reason. 
Empiricism and scientism are dogmatic because of their unnoticed presup-
positions. It is a deep irony, therefore, when He gel is attacked for talking about 
absolute claims. The messenger gets punished for the message. The message 
is that atomistic scientism and empiricism are theories of absolute truth and 
knowledge and propose allegedly ‘objective’ claims about sense perceptions as 
the ‘real’ basis of knowledge and truth. A similar point holds for the parallel 
‘sentimental’ theories of happiness and goodness in the traditions of ethical 
empiricism.
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